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Code), “ordinary and necessary” business expenses are  
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tax deductible. 1  Traditionally, most advertising costs  
are specifically included within these tax deductions.2  While 
advertising generally serves as a useful channel to inform 
consumers, the direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) of 
prescription drugs should not, and need not constitutionally, 
be treated the same as other advertising.  As the Magazine 
Publishers’ Association put it, “You can learn all you need to 
know about beer in [thirty] seconds.  But, a prescription 
drug?” 3   Prescription drugs have the ability to improve 
people’s health when appropriately prescribed, but can have a 
range of negative short- and long-term consequences when 
inappropriately used.  Prescribing decisions should therefore 
be based on scientific evidence with the goal of obtaining the 
best possible treatment, instead of making additional profits 
for the drug companies. 4   Thus, Congress could consider 
revoking the tax deductions for DTCA as a means of imposing 
a “sin tax” 5  to disincentivize spending on DTCA without 
running afoul of regulating speech.6 
Proponents of DTCA argue that it provides important 
benefits, such as improving public health by encouraging 
viewers to speak with their doctors about health problems 
that might otherwise go untreated. 7   Opponents, however, 
 1. 26 U.S.C. § 162(a) (2006). 
 2. See 26 U.S.C. § 162(j) (saying that “certain foreign advertising expenses” 
are explicitly excluded); see also, e.g., Poletti v. Commissioner, 330 F.2d 818, 822 
(8th Cir. 1964). 
 3. Tamar V. Terzian, Direct-To-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising, 
25 AM. J.L. & MED. 149, 164 (1999) (citing an advertisement which appeared in 
the Wall Street Journal). 
 4. See Ray Moynihan et al., Selling Sickness: The Pharmaceutical Industry 
and Disease Mongering, 324 BRIT. MED. J. 886, 886 (2002) [hereinafter 
Moynihan et al., Selling Sickness] (stating that “[i]nappropriate medicalization 
carries the dangers of unnecessary labelling, [sic] poor treatment decisions, 
iatrogenic illness, and economic waste, as well as the opportunity costs that 
result when resources are diverted away from treating or preventing more 
serious disease”). 
 5. See Rachel E. Morse, Resisting the Path of Least Resistance: Why the 
Texas “Pole Tax” and the New Class of Modern Sin Taxes Are Bad Policy, 29 
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 189, 191 (2009) (explaining sin taxes as “targeted excise 
taxes imposed on the sale of disfavored goods or services” which are commonly 
used in connection with alcohol and tobacco). 
 6. See generally David I. Walker, Suitable for Framing: Business 
Deductions in a Net Income Tax System, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 1251 
(2011) (discussing sin taxes and the common use thereof to encourage or 
discourage non-tax behavior). 
 7. This point, however, is undisputed.  Indeed, some believe that DTCA 
has a positive impact.  See, e.g., Mark B. McClellan, MD, Ph.D., FDA 
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argue that DTCA disperses deceptive information, hinders 
the patient-doctor relationship, encourages patients to choose 
drug-based solutions over lifestyle-based ones, reduces the 
amount spent on research and development, and increases 
spending on drugs without a corresponding health benefit.8  
Indeed, DTCA spending has out-paced spending on research 
and development 9  and the prevalence of Food and Drug  
Administration (FDA) warning letters demonstrates 
pharmaceutical companies’ frequent failures to comply  
with advertising regulations that the FDA is under- 
resourced to police.10  During September 2010 alone, the FDA  
issued eleven warning letters to pharmaceutical companies 
primarily regarding “internet marketing of unapproved and 
misbranded drugs.”11  The problem with DTCA has “attracted 
Commissioner, Speech before First International Colloquium on Generic 
Medicine (Sept. 25, 2003), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/ 
Speeches/ucm053614.htm (stating that “on net [DTC] advertising benefits the 
public health” and also arguing that “although the ads are highly visible, they 
account for less than 2 percent of U.S. pharmaceutical spending, and so they 
can’t be a key driver of drug costs”); see also Frank Lichtenberg & Gautier 
Duflos, Time Release: The Effect of Patent Expiration on U.S. Drug Prices, 
Marketing and Utilization by the Public, 11 MED. PROGRESS REP. 1, 12 (2009) 
(explaining that “marketing has a significant impact on utilization” which in 
turn improves public health and therefore restrictions on advertising should be 
carefully considered). 
 8. See, e.g., Marcia Angell, Relationships with the Drug Industry: Keep at 
Arm’s Length, 338 BRIT. MED. J. b222 (2009) [hereinafter Angell, Relationships] 
(explaining that DTCA is often aimed at “me-too drugs and are designed to 
convince viewers that one is better than another, despite the fact that these 
drugs are seldom compared in clinical trials at equivalent doses.  Many seek to 
convince people that they have chronic disorders that require lifelong drug 
treatment . . . . with the implication that it needs to be treated to prevent 
serious complications . . . . We need to stop accepting the fiction that marketing, 
whether to prescribers or patients, is good education.”). 
 9. See MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: HOW 
THEY DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 132–33 (2004) [hereinafter 
ANGELL, THE TRUTH].  U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-
54, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN FDA’S OVERSIGHT OF 
DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING 5, 12 (Nov. 2006) [hereinafter GAO-07-54], 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0754.pdf. 
 10. See, e.g., Bad Ad Program: FDA Aims to Keep Drug Promotion Truthful, 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ 
ConsumerUpdates/ucm211791.htm; Susan Heavey & Lisa Richwine, Special 
Report: Outgunned FDA Tries to Get Tough with Drug Ads, REUTERS (Sept. 3, 
2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/03/us-drugs-advertising-idUSTRE 
6821PN20100903. 
 11. Warning Letters 2009, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ 
Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/EnforcementActivitiesbyFD
A/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmaceuticalCompanies/ucm
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460 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
enough congressional attention to warrant at least six bills in 
the 110th Congress as well as concerns from members in the 
111th.”12  For instance, the Say No to Drug Ads Act of 2009 
proposed the removal of tax deductions specifically for 
DTCA.13  Yet, to the relief of the drug companies and the 
marketing industry, multiple bills introduced to Congress 
proposing to remove the tax deductions have not been 
passed.14  Neither this Article nor the proposed legislation 
discussed herein suggests that pharmaceutical companies’ 
ability to advertise should be revoked.  As Congressman 
Daniel Lipinski said, “I am not looking to infringe upon any 
company’s right to advertise, only to help assure that the 
American taxpayers are not subsidizing these industries in 
our health care system.”15 
 
055773.htm (last updated June 27, 2011). 
 12. SUSAN THAUL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40590, DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER 
ADVERTISING OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 3 (2009) [hereinafter THAUL, CRS 
REPORT], available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40590_20090520.pdf 
(“Members of the 111th Congress have indicated interest in DTC advertising in 
the context of drug safety, tax treatment of advertising expenses, risk 
communication, and general FDA-activity authority and oversight, sometimes 
in the context of broader discussions of health care costs and reform.”). 
 13. H.R. 2966, 111th Cong. (2009) (stating that “[n]o deduction shall be 
allowed . . . for any amount paid or incurred for a direct-to-consumer 
advertisement of a prescription drug”); S. 2842, 111th Cong. (2009) (stating that 
“[n]o deduction shall be allowed . . . for expenses relating to direct to consumer 
advertising in any media for the sale and use of prescription pharmaceuticals 
for any taxable year”); S. 2873, 111th Cong. (2009) (same).  Some of the 
proposed legislation, such as the Protecting Americans from Drug Marketing 
Act of 2009, proposed revoking tax deductions for all pharmaceutical 
advertising and promotion.  H.R. 3979, 111th Cong. (2009) (stating that “[n]o 
deduction shall be allowed . . . for expenses relating to advertising or promoting 
the sale and use of prescription pharmaceuticals for any taxable year” and 
defining “advertising or promoting” to include “direct to consumer advertising in 
any media and any activity designed to promote the use of prescription 
pharmaceutical directed to providers or others who may make decisions about 
the use or prescription pharmaceuticals”); S. 1763, 111th Cong. (2009) (same); 
H.R. 2917, 111th Cong. (2009) (stating that “[n]o deduction shall be allowed . . . 
with respect to (1) any advertisement primarily for purpose of promoting the 
sale or use of any prescribed drug”). 
 14. H.R. 2917; John Eggerton, Health Care Bill Won’t End Tax Deductions 
for Prescription Drug Ads, BENTON FOUND. (July 15, 2009), http://www.benton. 
org/node/26474. 
 15. Letter from Representative Daniel Lipinski to Representative Charles 
B. Rangel and Representative Dave Camp (July 15, 2009) [hereinafter Lipinski 
Letter].  For more information on Congressman Daniel Lipinski, see his 
website, http://www.lipinski.house.gov/. 
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The First Amendment protects the pharmaceutical 
industry’s commercial free speech and right to advertise,  
and prevents Congress from either imposing content-  
and speaker-based restrictions16 or prohibiting industry from 
spending on DTCA.  Also, as previously mentioned, DTCA 
proponents present several compelling arguments more 
thoroughly discussed below.  It is not necessary, however, to 
continue to allow tax deductions for DTCA in order to 
maintain those benefits and the constitution does not require 
the continued allowance of a tax deduction.  The arguments 
for disincentivizing DTCA apply regardless of the content.  
The focus is on the listener, not the speaker.  The tendency of 
drug advertising to mislead merely provides a facially-neutral 
justification for revoking the deductions.17 
The Tax Code is regularly and frequently used for  
social engineering to affect non-tax behaviors.18   Congress 
allows tax breaks for actions or behaviors they want to 
encourage and denies them, or imposes sin taxes for those 
they wish to discourage or believe have low social value.19  
Even constitutionally important topics such as religious 
donations and gun purchases may be taxed, or exempted, by 
legislative decision.  Here, forcing the pharmaceutical 
industry to internalize the full cost of advertising by 
removing the subsidy may encourage them to consider more 
carefully whether their ads’ content complies with FDA 
regulations aimed at accurate portrayals of the drugs.  
Thereby, Congress could reduce DTCA without violating the 
First Amendment through outright bans or restrictions based 
on an ad’s content or speaker.  Further, removing tax 
deductions also results in administrative simplification and is 
therefore a preferred means of attempting to address  
non-tax behaviors.20  One such bill was estimated to raise 
 16. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2671 (2011) (“State[s] may 
not seek to remove a popular but disfavored product from the marketplace by 
prohibiting truthful, nonmisleading advertisements that contain impressive 
endorsements or catchy jingles.  That [a s]tate finds expression too persuasive 
does not permit it to quiet the speech or to burden its messengers.”). 
 17. Advertising pharmaceuticals directly to consumers is suspect regardless 
of who is responsible for the advertisement.  Particularly in light of Sorrell, 
Congress must be wary of focusing on a particular viewpoint or speaker.  See id. 
at 2663–64. 
 18. See generally Walker, supra note 6, at 1251. 
 19. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 162 (2006). 
 20. See David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and 
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462 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
approximately $37 billion in revenue, which would not 
prevent the industry from advertising, but could help cover 
the cost of other government programs and likely reduce  
the overall prominence of DTCA.21  Thus, removing the tax 
deductions for DTCA is constitutionally permissible, properly 
aligned with public policy,22 and Congress could remove the 
deductions. 
This Article first discusses the factual and legal 
background leading up to the proposed DTCA tax deduction 
removal, including: a brief history of DTCA regulation, 
pharmaceutical industry promotion and its effects, the 
relevant IRC provisions and constitutional limits on 
Congress’ power.  Next, this Article examines the legal and 
policy reasons why the removal of the tax deductions is 
advisable and permissible.  Specifically, the removal would 
not infringe upon the First Amendment-protected commercial 
free speech, even under heightened-scrutiny as recently 
applied in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.23  In Sorrell, the Court 
maintained that regulatory differences between industries 
would still survive a constitutional challenge if there was 
reason to believe that fraud was more likely in one industry.24  
The Court also suggested that it might be more flexible with 
respect to consumer protection matters.25  This reasoning 
should apply to the revocation of deductions for DTCA which 
generally does not explain alternative therapies and may 
interfere with the doctor-patient relationship leading  
to excess prescribing, thereby contributing to the cost of  
health care without a correspondingly healthier population.26  
Additionally, Congress has disallowed, and the Supreme 
Court has approved, the revocation of deductions in many 
Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 958 (2004) [hereinafter Weisbach & 
Nussim, Tax and Spending]. 
 21. See Ryan J. Donmoyer, House Considering $37 Billion Drug Tax, Rangel 
Says, BLOOMBERG (June 16, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news? 
pid=newsarchive&sid=aeEJZicjYE60. 
 22. See generally Walker, supra note 6, at 1251–53. 
 23. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
 24. Id. at 2672. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See Walker, supra note 6 at 1251–53; RxP Weekly Reader: Bailout 
Edition, POSTSCRIPT (Oct. 2, 2008), http://postscript.communitycatalyst.org/ 
?p=223 (“The FDA has warned five drug makers about false or misleading 
advertisements of five ADHD drugs, according to the Bureau of National Affairs 
Health Care Daily Report.”). 
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2012]  DEDUCTIONS FOR DRUG ADS? 463 
other instances as within Congress’ broad authority under the 
Sixteenth Amendment to both tax the public and revoke 
deductions.27  Further, lobbying, which like DTCA occurs in 
the ordinary course of business and aims to persuade people, 
is specifically not tax-exempt due to Congress’ concern over 
“undue influence[.]”28  Yet Congress allows full tax deductions 
for DTCA. 
This Article also addresses why implementing a 
disincentive through the IRC would be preferable to 
increasing FDA regulation.  First, utilizing the IRC would be 
more practical and involve fewer administrative costs.  
Second, FDA faces constitutional limitations on its ability  
to monitor advertisements’ content.  Finally, this Article 
acknowledges several potential problems with the deductions’ 
removal and offers that while a complete removal is 
preferred, Congress should in the alternative consider 
instituting a cap on the amount deductible for DTCA 
spending. 
I. SUMMARY OF THE FACTS AND LAW 
A. A Brief History of DTCA Regulation 
Richard G. Frank, Professor of Health Economics at 
Harvard Medical School, defines DTCA as “any promotional 
effort by a pharmaceutical company to present prescription 
drug information to the general public in the lay media.”29  
This “includes advertisements targeted toward consumers 
through magazines, newspapers, television, radio, and 
outdoor advertising.”30  DTCA encompasses three categories: 
 27. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 162 (2006); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 
U.S. 574 (1983) (approving removal of tax exempt status); New Colonial Ice Co. 
v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934); Knight v. Commissioner, 552 U.S. 181, 
192 (2008) (“noting the familiar rule that an income tax deduction is a matter of 
legislative grace” (citing INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 
(1992) (internal quotations omitted))). 
 28. Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, What Is This “Lobbying” That We Are So Worried 
About?, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 485, 496 (2008) [hereinafter Mayer, Lobbying]. 
 29. Michael S. Wilkes, Robert A. Bell & Richard L. Kravitz, Direct-To-
Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising: Trends, Impact, and Implications, 19 
HEALTH AFF. 110, 112 (2000), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/ 
content/19/2/110.full.pdf. 
 30. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., IMPACT OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING 
ON PRESCRIPTION DRUG SPENDING 4 (2003), available at http://www.kff.org/ 
rxdrugs/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=14378. 
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help-seeking ads, reminder ads, and product-claim ads. 31  
Help-seeking ads aim to get viewers to see their doctor about 
a particular condition, but do not mention any specific drug or 
treatment.32  Reminder ads state the name of the drug—but 
do not discuss the condition it treats or make health claims—
and the FDA does not require full risk disclosure.33  Finally, 
product-claim ads include both the drug’s name and 
therapeutic claims and must include full risk information.34 
In recognition of the weaknesses of the Pure Food and 
Drugs Act of 1906 and Federal Food, Drugs and Cosmetics 
Act of 1938 to address advertising, Congress passed the 1962 
Kefauver-Harris Amendments.  These amendments, directed 
at advertising to physicians, transferred regulatory authority 
for pharmaceutical marketing from the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) to FDA.35  These amendments required 
that ads not be false or misleading, present a fair balance of 
the drug’s risks and benefits, contain facts relevant to the 
advertised and approved use, list contraindications, and be 
submitted to FDA upon publication.36  DTCA first attracted 
the FDA’s attention in the early 1980s.37  Following a brief 
voluntary moratorium to study the practice, FDA deemed the 
1960s regulations regarding physician advertising adequate 
 31. THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 4–5. 
 32. Id. at 4.  Please note that these ads tend to be coordinated by the 
company to coincide with heavy marketing to doctors about a particular drug.  
U.S. GEN’L ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Report, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: FDA 
OVERSIGHT OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING HAS LIMITATIONS 11 (Oct. 
2002) (stating that “DTC advertising is concentrated among a small number of 
drugs for chronic conditions and many of these same drugs are also promoted to 
physicians, both factors that may lead to increased sales.”). 
 33. THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 4–5.  The Report also notes that 
these ads are primarily directed towards providers who already have a base 
knowledge of the product.  Id. 
 34. Id. at 5. 
 35. 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (2006). 
 36. For a more in-depth discussion of the history of regulation, see Victor E. 
Schwartz et al., Marketing Pharmaceutical Products in the Twenty-First 
Century: An Analysis of the Continued Viability of Traditional Principles of Law 
in the Age of Direct-To-Consumer Advertising, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 333, 
336–40 (2009) [hereinafter Schwartz, Viability]; THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra 
note 12, at 8–14. 
 37. Wayne L. Pines, A History and Perspective on Direct-to-Consumer 
Promotion, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 489, 491–92 (1999) [hereinafter Pines, DTC 
History]; see also Schwartz, Viability, supra note 36, at 336–37 (stating that 
“[c]ompanies that sell medications have advertised their products directly to 
consumers since the beginning of medicine”). 
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to apply to DTCA.38  As a result of the cumbersome summary 
requirements, these regulations effectively prohibited 
broadcast DTCA.39 
Interestingly, one study conducted by the FDA in the 
1980s, which in-part led to the allowance of DTCA, found that 
consumers retained more information regarding the drug’s 
benefits than its risks, and that print ads are relatively more 
effective than broadcast ones at conveying risk information.40  
Yet, the FDA deemed that presenting only a “fair balance” of 
the risks and benefits was necessary to inform consumers 
effectively.41  Other than a January 2009 guidance regarding 
what device manufacturers, drug manufacturers or 
representatives may disseminate regarding off-label usage,42 
the regulations have remained relatively constant and there 
remains no distinction between the FDA’s regulations for 
physician and consumer advertising.43 
Initially, the FDA did not allow product-specific  
advertisements.44   Drug companies could either advertise 
symptoms with a message for consumers to see their doctor or 
mention the name of a product, but could not indicate  
 38. Pines, DTC History, supra note 37, at 492; Prescription Drug Promotion: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce & 
Tourism of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 107th Cong. (2001) 
[hereinafter Ostrove Testimony], available at http://www.fda.gov/News 
Events/Testimony/ucm115206.htm (statement of Nancy M. Ostrove, Ph.D., 
Deputy Director, Food & Drug Admin.) (“On September 9, 1985, FDA withdrew 
the moratorium in a Federal Register (FR) Notice (50 FR 36677), which stated 
that the ‘current regulations governing prescription drug advertising provide 
sufficient safeguards to protect consumers.’ ” ). 
 39. See Ostrove Testimony, supra note 38. 
 40. Pines, DTC History, supra note 37, at 492; see also Joel J. Davis, 
Consumers’ Preferences for the Communication of Risk Information in Drug 
Advertising, 26 HEALTH AFF. 863, 863–64 (2007) (citing Kathryn Aikin, The 
Impact of Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising on the Physician-
Patient Relationship (Sept. 22, 2003)). 
 41. The FTC has also recognized potential problems with the conveyance of 
risk information to consumers in advertisements.  See FTC Staff Provides 
Comments to FDA on Direct-to-Consumer Drug and Device Ads, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N (May 12, 2004), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/05/dtcdrugs.shtm. 
 42. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GOOD REPRINT 
PRACTICES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL ARTICLES AND 
MEDICAL OR SCIENTIFIC REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW USES 
OF APPROVED DRUGS AND APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL DEVICES (2009), 
available at http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm125126. 
htm. 
 43. See Ostrove Testimony, supra note 38. 
 44. Pines, DTC History, supra note 37, at 494. 
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its purpose.45  For example, these regulations permitted a 
commercial advertising the prescription drug Claritin, 
featuring only a singer crooning about “blue skies” and a 
“kind voice instruct[ing] the viewer to ‘see your doctor about  
Claritin.’ ” 46  Incidentally, this ad does not educate the public 
regarding a disease or treatment thereby failing to satisfy the 
pharmaceutical industry’s primary justification for DTCA. 
Rather than educate the public, the message appeals  
to the individual’s emotions.47  Calm, cloudless, blue skies 
present a soothing image and a carefree outlook.  The 
advertisement, for an allergy medication, could just as easily 
promote a statin or antipsychotic drug.  These advertisements 
grab viewers’ attention, but not because they suffer from a 
debilitating allergy.  Curious, the viewer will ask his doctor 
and as a result may discover some low-grade allergy.48  In 
American culture, with the promotion of perfection and quick-
fixes, those with very mild symptoms would likely disregard 
the side effects and opt to take the drug when no treatment or 
a generic, cheaper drug would also suffice. In 1995, 
“[c]oncerned that consumers were confused by the choppy 
nature of broadcast DTC advertising,” the FDA held a 
“hearing on the putative risks and benefits of easing its 
regulation” and in 1997 began to allow product-specific 
advertisements.49 
Simultaneously, the FDA also released the “Guidance for 
Industry:  Consumer-Directed  Broadcast  Advertisements.”50  
For print ads, the guidance still required a “brief summary” 
listing all the risks in the drug’s prescribing information and 
at least one FDA-approved use.51  Alternatively, recognizing 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See, e.g., Sidney M. Wolfe, Editorial, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising—
Education or Emotion Promotion?, 346 NEW ENG.  J. MED. 524, 525 (2002). 
 48. According to Claritin’s website, about fifty million Americans are 
affected by allergies.  Questions & Answers, CLARITIN, http://www.claritin.com/ 
claritin/learn/questions-answers.jspa#question4 (last visited Oct. 4, 2011). 
 49. Jeremy A. Greene & David Herzberg, Hidden in Plain Sight: Marketing 
Prescription Drugs to Consumers in the Twentieth Century, 100 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 793, 800 (2010). 
 50. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CONSUMER-DIRECTED 
BROADCAST ADVERTISEMENTS (1999), available at http://www.fda.gov/ 
downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm125064.pdf [hereinafter FDA 
1999 GUIDANCE]; see also Ostrove Testimony, supra note 38. 
 51. FDA 1999 GUIDANCE, supra note 50, at 1. 
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that the not-so-brief summary information presented an 
insurmountable challenge in a thirty- or sixty-second 
commercial, the FDA eased the requirements for broadcast 
ads.52   This change allowed industry to include only an 
“adequate provision” with a “major statement” of the  
most important risk information that informs viewers  
or listeners where to find the full FDA-approved  
prescribing information.53   In the wake of the DTCA 
regulatory relaxation, the pharmaceutical industry spends 
the majority of its DTCA budget on television commercials.54 
In 2004, FDA issued a draft Guidance for Industry 
entitled “Brief Summary: Disclosing Risk Information in 
Consumer-Directed Print Advertisements.”55  The guidance 
again distinguishes between print and broadcast 
advertisements, requiring a brief summary for print ads, but 
not for broadcast ads.  This, however, may be a distinc- 
tion without a difference.56   While the guidance “strongly 
encourages the use of consumer-friendly language in all 
consumer-directed materials,” the “FDA cannot object . . . 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 2. 
 54. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PROMOTIONAL SPENDING FOR PRESCRIPTION 
DRUGS 3 (2009) [hereinafter CBO REPORT]; Peter Lurie, DTC Advertising 
Harms Patients and Should Be Tightly Regulated, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 444, 
444 (2009) (describing the FDA’s removal of the brief summary requirement as 
the “regulatory change that produced the growth in DTC advertising”); Caroline 
L. Nadal, The Societal Value of Prescription Drug Advertisements in the New 
Millennium: Targeted Consumers Become the Learned, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 451, 479–
80 (2001) (explaining that as result of the FDA “relax[ing] its guidelines for 
product-specific television and radio ads . . . . DTC marketing [grew] 
exponentially with pharmaceutical manufacturers spending almost $1.9 billion 
on DTC advertisements in 1999, more than triple what they spent in 1996”); 
Shannon Pettypiece, Less Sex, Rock-n-Roll as Drugmakers React to FDA TV Ad 
Scrutiny, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news 
?pid=newsarchive&sid=aVe6AAgRw_0Y. 
 55. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: BRIEF SUMMARY: 
DISCLOSING RISK INFORMATION IN CONSUMER-DIRECTED PRINT 
ADVERTISEMENTS (2004) [hereinafter FDA 2004 DRAFT GUIDANCE], available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformatio
n/Guidances/ucm069984.pdf.  While the FDA refers to the guidance as a “draft,” 
it reflects the Administration’s current practice.  THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra 
note 12, at 11. 
 56. See, e.g., DDMAC Frequently Asked Questions, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDER/ucm090308.htm (last 
updated June 18, 2009) (The “FDA has also heard concerns about the lack of 
value of the required information [in the brief summary] from some individuals 
and groups.”). 
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solely on the basis that the risk information is not presented 
in consumer-friendly language.”57  Accordingly, to satisfy the 
brief summary requirement many manufacturers include the 
full FDA-approved labeling.58   Nevertheless, as the FDA 
astutely points out, providing the full labeling information “is 
less than optimal.”59  In effect, the FDA admits that while this 
approach complies with the regulations, it fails to convey the 
information necessary to educate consumers appropriately.60  
Thus, the additional brief summary requirement in print ads 
does not prove any more effective in communicating 
appropriate use, benefit, and risk information to consumers. 
In 2006, Congress amended the Lanham Act designed to 
prevent false advertising claims.61  The Act provides, in part, 
a civil penalty for anyone who “in commercial advertising or 
promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, 
qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another 
person’s goods, services, or commercial activities.” 62   The 
statute further allows for “action by any person who believes 
that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.”63 
Congress also addressed DTCA in the Food and Drug 
Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA).64  First, 
the FDAAA authorized the FDA to charge industry a fee to 
review DTCA prior to publication in order to fund the 
additional staff essential to that task.65  In January of 2008, 
however, the FDA announced it would not implement this 
 57. FDA 2004 DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 55, at 1. 
 58. Id. at 3. 
 59. Id. at 2. 
 60. Id. (“Although this approach complies with the brief summary 
requirement, FDA believes it is less than optimal for consumer-directed print 
advertisements because many consumers do not have the technical background 
to understand this information.  Moreover, the volume of the material, coupled 
with the format in which it is presented (i.e., very small print and sophisticated 
medical terminology) discourages its use and makes the information less 
comprehensible to consumers.  In general, FDA believes that exhaustive lists of 
minor risks distract from and make it difficult to comprehend and retain 
information on the more important risks.  FDA also believes that information 
intended for a consumer should optimally be communicated in language fully 
understandable by a lay reader and presented in an easily readable format.”). 
 61. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2006). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA) of 2007, Pub. 
L. No. 110–85, 121 Stat. 823 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.). 
 65. 21 U.S.C.A. § 379h-1. 
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program.66   Second, the FDAAA authorized the FDA to 
require submission of television ads at least forty-five days 
before their airdate, after which the Secretary may 
recommend, but not require or actually make, changes to the 
advertisement.67  This expanded authority has also not been 
utilized.  Third, the FDAAA sets forth civil penalties for  
the sponsoring of false or misleading DTCA.68  Finally, the 
FDAAA required all DTCA to include a statement 
encouraging the reporting of negative side effects.69 
FDA only reviews ads once published, but even then does 
not review all ads.70  When the FDA discovers a violation, 
their enforcement options include: sending an untitled letter 
or a warning letter, imposing a civil monetary penalty, 
criminally prosecuting the company, seizing a product,  
or withdrawing their approval for sale.71  Upon finding a 
problem with an ad, the FDA typically responds first with an 
untitled letter, also known as a notice of violation, then a 
warning letter, and finally an injunction.72  Despite the FDA’s 
contention that warning letters serve as a sufficient threat to 
prevent the need for further action, their prevalence indicates 
that by themselves they are an insufficient regulatory tool.73 
 66. User Fee Program for Advisory Review of Direct-to-Consumer Television 
Advertisements for Prescription Drug and Biological Products; Program Will 
Not Be Implemented, 73 Fed. Reg. 2924 (Jan. 16, 2008). 
 67. 21 U.S.C.A. § 353b. 
 68. 21 U.S.C.A. § 333.  The FDAAA established that the maximum penalty 
would be $250,000 for the first offence, and $500,000 for any subsequent offence 
in a three-year period.  However, the repeated dissemination of the same ad 
only counts as one violation. 
 69. 21 U.S.C.A. § 352(n).  The statute requires that the following statement 
be included: “You are encouraged to report negative side effects of prescription 
drugs to the FDA.  Visit www.fda.gov/medwatch, or call 1-800-FDA-1088.”  Id. 
 70. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-54, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: 
IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN FDA’S OVERSIGHT OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER 
ADVERTISING 5 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0754.pdf. 
 71. Id. at 11. 
 72. DONNA U. VOGT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32853, DIRECT-TO-
CONSUMER ADVERTISING OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 29 (2005), available at 
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/RL328530325
2005.pdf (stating that “FDA believes that the . . . warning letter is a powerful 
tool in its regulatory arsenal”). 
 73. See Warning Letters, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ 
ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/default.htm (last updated Oct. 4, 
2011); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-177, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: 
FDA OVERSIGHT OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING HAS LIMITATIONS 21–
22 (2002) [hereinafter FDA OVERSIGHT], available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d03177.pdf. 
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 96 Side B      04/16/2012   17:10:32
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 96 Side B      04/16/2012   17:10:32
 SPEISER/OUTTERSON FINAL 3/14/2012  4:32:02 PM 
470 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
B. Pharmaceutical Industry Promotion and its Effects 
Following the 1997 DTCA regulatory relaxation, 
promotional spending across the pharmaceutical industry 
increased from $11.4 billion in 1996 to $29.9 billion in 2005.74  
In 2008, the pharmaceutical industry spent $20.5 billion, 
placing them second only to the auto industry in 
advertising.75  The rate of increase in promotional spending 
has out-paced  spending   on  research and development.76  
Currently, the United States spends 17.3% of the Gross 
Domestic Product on healthcare, outpatient pharmaceuticals 
accounting for approximately 10% of those costs.77  While 
DTCA, at about $4.2 billion, represents only a small fraction 
of pharmaceutical industry spending, it is continually 
expanding and, as proponents and opponents of DTCA agree, 
effective.78 
Despite attempts by the FDA to require a balanced 
portrayal of the risks and benefits of each drug, such a 
balance is unlikely.79  The pharmaceutical industry has a 
 74. Julie M. Donohue et al., A Decade of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of 
Prescription Drugs, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 673, 673 (2007) [hereinafter 
Donohue, A Decade of DTCA], available at http://www.nejm.org/ 
doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsa070502. 
 75. Noreen O’Leary, Sen. Bill Nelson Backs off on Drug Ads, ADWEEK (Sept. 
16, 2009), http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising-branding/sen-bill-nelson-
backs-drug-ads-100360.  This number actually represents a decline from the 
industry’s peak spending in 2006, which amounted to $5.2 billion.  See CBO 
REPORT, supra note 54, at 2.  But see ANGELL, THE TRUTH, supra note 9, at 122 
(explaining that the exact amount spent yearly by industry is unclear, but 
higher than they report). 
 76. GAO-07-54, supra note 9, at 5, 12; Lipinski Letter, supra note 15 
(explaining that “[s]pending by drug companies on consumer advertising has 
quadrupled since 1996, even outpacing spending on research and 
development”); FDA OVERSIGHT, supra note 73, at 9. 
 77. See Micah Hartman et al., Health Spending Growth at a Historic Low in 
2008, 29 HEALTH AFF. 147, 148 exhibit 1 (2010). 
 78. See ANGELL, THE TRUTH, supra note 9, at 123; Donohue, A Decade of 
DTCA, supra note 74, at 675 (stating that at $4.2 billion “[i]n 2005, only 14% of 
total industry expenditures on pharmaceutical promotion were devoted to such 
advertising.”); Faith McLellan, US Government Report Released on Deceptive 
Drug Advertisements, 360 LANCET 1951, 1951 (2002), available at 
http://www.lancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736%2802%2911947-
7/fulltext (stating that every year approximately 8.5 million people request and 
receive prescriptions as a result of DTCA). 
 79. Cf. Joanna K. Sax, Protecting Scientific Integrity: The Commercial 
Speech Doctrine Applied to Industry Publications, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 203, 205 
(2011).  Sax found that even the research used to support drugs tends to be 
slanted.  Id.   
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clear financial incentive to aggressively promote their 
products.  Drug companies are for-profit businesses and 
spend billions each year to advertise because the industry 
receives a high return on this investment.80  Studies have 
shown that each $1 spent on advertising yields between about 
$4.20 and $6.50 in drug sales.81  The Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) reported that “the [ten drugs] with the highest 
DTC expenditures in 2008 accounted for [thirty] percent  
of expenditures for DTC advertising industrywide.”82  This 
increase in drug use and profits, however, does not  
correlate with a healthier population.83  Rather, pharmaceu-
tical advertising results in the overuse of brand-name 
prescription drugs and more expensive treatments instead of 
Previous studies demonstrate that industry publications have a bias in 
that they tend to report positive results of clinical trials.  This is not 
surprising because industry has a profit-seeking motive and companies 
are likely to closely monitor the progress and process of a research 
study in such a way that adverse results may be suppressed leading to 
the publication of biased results. 
Id. 
 80. Terzian, supra note 3, at 166–67; see also Schwartz, Viability, supra 
note 36, at 335; Lichtenberg & Duflos, supra note 7, at 12 (stating that 
“marketing has a significant impact on utilization”); QIUPING GU ET AL., NAT’L 
CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, NCHS DATA BRIEF NO. 42, PRESCRIPTION DRUG 
USE CONTINUES TO INCREASE: U.S. PRESCRIPTION DRUG DATA FOR 2007–2008 1 
(2010), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db42.pdf. 
 81. Lipinski Letter, supra note 15; THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 
25.  But see Heavy Drug Ad Spending Doesn’t Pay Off, MARKETINGCHARTS (Apr. 
12, 2010), http://www.marketingcharts.com/television/heavy-drug-ad-spending-
doesnt-pay-off-12554/ (stating that advertising spending does not necessarily 
correlate with profits). 
 82. CBO REPORT, supra note 54, at 4–5 (discussing the drugs in the CBO’s 
data set); see also Donohue, A Decade of DTCA, supra note 74, at 676 (“The 20 
drugs with the highest spending made up 54.4% of total industry spending on 
advertising in 2005 . . . .”). 
 83. See, e.g., THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 1, 21 (noting that 
DTCA “are susceptible to marketing needs that interfere with objective 
presentations” and “the American Medical Association (AMA) Council on 
Ethical and Judicial Affairs . . . found . . . that 44% of promotional material to 
physicians ‘would lead to improper prescribing,’ ”  and recommended that 
providers “remain vigilant to ensure that DTC advertising does not promote 
expectations”); Jared A. Favole, FDA Warns Drug Companies On Promotional 
Material, DOW JONES NEWSWIRES, Feb. 3, 2010 (noting warnings issued to 
major pharmaceutical companies Eli Lilly & Co., United Therapeutics Corp. and 
Sanofi-Aventis SA for misleading promotional materials).  But see generally, 
Frank R. Lichtenberg, Effects of New Drugs on Overall Health Spending: Frank 
Lichtenberg Responds, 26 HEALTH AFF. 887 (2007) (finding “that, in general, 
using newer drugs has reduced nondrug costs more than it has increased drug 
costs . . .”).  
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equally effective, cheaper options, thereby raising the cost of 
healthcare for everyone.84 
“The great majority of DTC ads are for very expensive 
me-too drugs that require a lot of pushing because there is no 
good reason to think they are any better than drugs already 
on the market.”85   DTCA also often aims to raise the 
significance of a relatively innocuous temporary problem to 
something far more serious.  For instance, “heartburn is 
elevated to gastrointestinal reflux disease, with the 
implication that it needs to be treated to prevent serious 
complications.”86  Once “people [are] convinced they have a 
treatable medical condition, then it is an easy step to sell 
them drugs to treat it.” 87   Moreover, the pharmaceutical 
industry optimizes the effect of DTCA by first heavily 
advertising to physicians.88  While industry and DTCA sup-
porters refer to these efforts as education, Marcia Angell, 
former New England Journal of Medicine Editor-in-Chief, 
noted the fact that this “ ‘ education’ comes out of the drug 
companies’ marketing budgets . . . . should tell you what is 
really going on.”89 
The for-profit pharmaceutical companies consider their 
promotional activities’ potential benefits and liabilities.  Even 
if a company knows they will have to pay a penalty after, in 
light of the expected revenue resulting from every dollar 
 84. See, e.g., Barry Meier et al., Medicine Fueled by Marketing Intensifies 
Trouble for Pain Pills, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2004, § 1, at 1 (explaining how 
Celebrex and Vioxx costing $2 or $3 per pill, were prescribed to many patients 
could have received the same effect, more safely, from over the counter drugs for 
only pennies per pill). 
 85. ANGELL, THE TRUTH, supra note 9, at 124. 
 86. Angell, Relationships, supra note 8. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See, e.g., Donohue, A Decade of DTCA, supra note 74, at 679 (explaining 
that “PhRMA, the industry trade group, has recommended that manufacturers 
delay such campaigns for new drugs until after health professionals have been 
sufficiently educated, although no details have been provided on how long a 
period was deemed necessary”); ANGELL, THE TRUTH, supra note 9, at 126.  For 
more information on drug detailing, see, e.g., Puneet Manchanda & Elisabeth 
Honka, The Effects and Role of Direct-to-Physician Marketing in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry: An Integrative Review, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & 
ETHICS 785, 808–09 (2005); Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the Pharmaceutical 
Industry: Is a Gift Ever Just a Gift?, 283 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 373, 377–79 (2000). 
 89. ANGELL, THE TRUTH, supra note 9, at 135 (the comment was made by 
Angell in the context of discussing “educational meetings arranged by 
pharmaceutical companies for physicians,” but similarly applies to DTCA). 
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spent on DTCA, the risk may be worth it to the company.90  In 
tort cases, manufacturers will generally be held directly liable 
to consumers for failure to warn.  By contrast, as a result of 
the learned intermediary doctrine, premised on the notion 
that physicians are in the best position to analyze an 
individual patient’s particular circumstances and the drug’s 
risks and benefits, pharmaceutical manufacturers are 
shielded from direct liability to consumers.91   Practically, 
however, the doctrine effectively allows the pharmaceutical 
industry to blame doctors for the manufacturer’s inadequate 
warnings.92  In Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., the New 
Jersey Supreme Court revoked the doctrine’s applicability for 
DTCA, recognizing that DTCA fundamentally impacts the 
doctor-patient relationship and therefore the initial policy 
justifications for the doctrine no longer applied.93  Since most 
states have not adopted a DTCA exception, industry shields 
itself from liability in many cases and does not calculate the 
full extent of potential harm from their advertisements.94 
 
 90. See Ozlem A. Bordes, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine and Direct-to-
Consumer Advertising: Should the Pharmaceutical Manufacturer Be Shielded 
from Liability?, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 267, 267–70 (2004); Schwartz, 
Viability, supra note 36, at 356 & n.121 (explaining the doctrine and noting that 
it has been abolished, at least with respect to DTCA, in New Jersey, West 
Virginia, etc.). 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Bordes, supra note 90, at 278; Erin Lenhardt, Why So Glum? 
Toward a Fair Balance of Competitive Interests in Direct-To-Consumer 
Advertising and the Well-Being of the Mentally Ill Consumers It Targets, 15 
HEALTH MATRIX 165, 166 (2005) [hereinafter Lenhardt, Why So Glum?] 
(arguing that even physicians “sometimes do not realize the persuasive effect of 
the spin contained [in drug advertisements]”). 
 93. Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999).  Note also that 
this decision follows Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 208 (D. Mass. 
1991), in which the court in a footnote allowed for an exception to the learned 
intermediary doctrine anytime a manufacturer advertises directly to consumers.  
Id. at 211 n.4.  See also State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 
S.E.2d 899 (W. Va. 2007) (rejecting the learned intermediary doctrine entirely, 
but focusing on DTCA in particular). 
 94. But see Schwartz, Viability, supra note 36, at 364–69 (arguing that 
creating a DTCA exception “represent[s] unsound policy”); Victor E. Schwartz et 
al., West Virginia As a Judicial Hellhole: Why Businesses Fear Litigating in 
State Courts, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 757, 778–82 (2009) (discussing West Virginia’s 
2007 wholesale rejection of the learned intermediary doctrine and thereby 
placing it “firmly at odds with fundamental tort principles expressed in the 
Second and Third Restatements”). 
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Similarly, in two recent cases, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth95 and 
Pliva v. Mensing,96 the Supreme Court held that federal laws 
preempt products liability cases against vaccine and  
pharmaceutical manufacturers, respectively. These two  
cases represent a departure from the 2009 decision in Wyeth 
v. Levine in which the Court held that federal law did not  
preempt state strict liability tort suits.97  In declining to find 
preemption, the Levine court considered the benefits of state 
tort litigation including “help[ing] the FDA in its oversight 
function by revealing important and previously unknown 
information about product-related risks, especially during the 
postapproval [sic] period, and by deterring manufacturers 
from acting irresponsibly and engaging in business tactics 
aimed at increasing product sales at the expense of  
patient safety.”98  Accordingly, raising costs associated which 
manufacturing and promotion of drugs may lead the industry 
to more carefully consider the practice. 
C. The Tax Code: A Potential Lever for Congress 
The Sixteenth Amendment broadly authorizes Congress 
to tax incomes.99  Generally, the IRC taxes businesses and 
individuals only on net income.  Accordingly, the IRC allows 
for the deduction of numerous expenses to try to achieve that 
result, including “ordinary and necessary” business 
expenses.100  The Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) definition 
of ordinary corresponds with a common sense understanding 
of ordinary.  “An ordinary expense is one that is common and 
accepted in your trade or business.”101  Necessary, on the 
other hand, is defined as to not require the expense to be 
“indispensable,” but rather “one that is helpful and 
 95. 131 S. Ct. 1068 (2011). 
 96. 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011). 
 97. 555 U.S. 555 (2009).  
 98. Aaron Kesselheim, Safety, Supply, and Suits — Litigation and the 
Vaccine Industry, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1485, 1486 (2011), available at 
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1102182. 
 99. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (“Congress shall have power to lay and collect 
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among 
the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.”). 
 100. 26 U.S.C. § 162 (2006). 
 101. Deducting Business Expenses, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=109807,00.html (last updated 
June 10, 2011) [hereinafter IRS Business Expenses]; see also Welch v. 
Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113–14 (1933); 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-1 (2004). 
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appropriate for your trade or business.” 102   Unlike tax 
deductions for individuals, deductions for corporations do not 
phase out at any income bracket.103 
Despite the general deductible rule, a deduction is not a 
matter of right.  As courts have repeatedly stated, Congress 
has the authority to tax gross income.  In New Colonial Ice 
Co. v. Helvering, the Supreme Court refused to infer a 
deduction where Congress had not explicitly allowed one.104  
As the Court explained, “[w]hether and to what extent 
deductions shall be allowed depends upon legislative 
grace.”105  IRC section 162 exempts certain expenses as a 
means of regulating and discouraging relevant non-tax 
behaviors.106  For instance, neither treble damage payments 
under the antitrust laws, nor certain foreign advertising 
expenses are deductible.107  Additionally, home mortgages are 
deductible, but rental payments are not and tax credits are 
given for installing solar panels, but not for wood-burning 
stoves.108  Advertising in general, however, is deductible.109  
But expenses that may produce a future benefit must be 
capitalized.110  The IRS, however, allows for the deduction of 
advertising expenses despite the fact that a particular 
campaign may last several years.111  Removing this deduction 
would increase the cost of advertising thereby discouraging 
industry from advertising as heavily.112  At the very least, it 
would cease the taxpayer subsidy of DTCA. 
 102. IRS Business Expenses, supra note 101; Welch, 290 U.S. at 113. 
 103. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 151(d)(3) (phasing out the allowance of a deduction for 
personal exemptions when the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income exceeds a 
certain amount); cf., e.g., I.R.C. § 162 (not providing any phase out amount for 
allowable trade or business deductions). 
 104. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Walker, supra note 6, at 1257. 
 107. I.R.C. § 162(g), (j). 
 108. I.R.C. § 162. 
 109. Id. 
 110. I.R.C. § 263A. 
 111. 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-20 (2004). 
 112. See Walker, supra note 6, at 1251 (explaining that the effect of certain 
other disallowances of tax deduction “discourage[s] [the] disfavored activity”). 
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 99 Side B      04/16/2012   17:10:32
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 99 Side B      04/16/2012   17:10:32
 SPEISER/OUTTERSON FINAL 3/14/2012  4:32:02 PM 
476 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
D. Objections to Removing the Tax Deductions 
1. Policy: Unfair to the Drug Industry113 
Proponents of DTCA defend the increase in prescription 
drug spending and healthcare costs by arguing  
that these practices lead to an overall healthier population.114  
Specifically, DTCA increases consumer knowledge, 
encourages people to see their doctors by removing the 
stigma, leads to the diagnosis of more diseases, reminds 
patients to refill and take their prescriptions, and helps 
individuals “achieve the maximum degree of material 
satisfaction.”115  As many have observed, however, while the 
consumer may be more informed after viewing an 
advertisement, they are not necessarily better informed.116  In 
light of the frequency with which FDA issues warning letters 
for failure to present a fair balance of a drug’s risks and 
benefits, it is clear that the quality of the information 
conveyed leaves something to be desired.  Moreover, even 
when risks and benefits are evenly presented, consumers 
retain more information regarding the advantages than the 
side effects.117 
 
 113. See Pat Kelly, DTC Advertising’s Benefits Far Outweigh Its 
Imperfections, HEALTH AFF. (Apr. 28, 2004), http://content.healthaffairs.org/ 
content/early/2004/04/28/hlthaff.w4.246.full.pdf+html. 
 114. See Kelly, supra note 113; Keeping Watch Over Direct-to-Consumer Ads, 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ 
ucm107170.htm (last updated Sept. 09, 2011) [hereinafter FDA Keeping Watch]; 
DTC Prescription Drug Advertising, AM. ADVERTISING FED’N, 
http://www.aaf.org/default.asp?id=248 (last updated Sept. 2008);  Peter J. Pitts, 
Turning Point or Tipping Point: New FDA Draft Guidance and the Future of 
DTC Advertising, HEALTH AFF., W4-259 (Apr. 28, 2004),  http://content.health 
affairs.org/content/suppl/2004/04/27/hlthaff.w4.259v1.DC1. 
 115. Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: 
Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
429, 433 (1971); see also FDA Keeping Watch, supra note 114. 
 116. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson and Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism 
Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 
1456 (1999); but see Kathryn J. Aikin, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of 
Prescription Drugs: Physician Survey Preliminary Results (2003), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDER/UCM148277.pd
f (reporting physician survey results that most doctors found that DTCA did 
help educate consumers about their health  problems).   
 117. Louis A. Morris & Lloyd G. Millstein, Drug Advertising to Consumers: 
Effects of Formats for Magazine and Television Advertisements, 39 FOOD DRUG 
COSM. L.J. 497, 500 (1984). 
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Proponents also point out that advertising can lead to 
lower drug prices.118  Even if advertising drives down its cost, 
when a drug is unnecessary, that expenditure is wasteful.  
Pharmaceutical companies are for-profit businesses; if 
advertising actually led to overall reduced costs, or more 
specifically, did not help increase their profits, they would 
stop advertising.  As many economists have noted, the “recent 
growth in DTC advertising has persuaded consumers to 
substitute new, more expensive drugs for older, lower-priced 
ones”119 thereby increasing profits for industry. 
2. First Amendment Limitations on Congressional 
Power 
Under the First Amendment, government may not  
censor speech.120  The 1942 Supreme Court in Valentine v. 
Chrestensen, however, held that the First Amendment 
protections did not extend to “purely commercial 
advertising.”121   Commercial speech, along with obscenity, 
fighting words, incitement, and defamation, remained 
unprotected as a result of “low social value,” failure to 
“contribute to the exchange of ideas and the search for truth, 
and because the social interests in order and morality 
outweigh any benefit that [it] produce[s].”122 
Thirty years later, the Supreme Court narrowly 
interpreted Valentine in Bigelow v. Virginia, revoking 
commercial speech’s per se unprotected status.123   Justice 
Blackmun announced that “speech is not stripped of First 
Amendment protection merely because it appears in [the] 
form [of commercial advertisements].”124  The Court further 
 118. See Lee Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 
J.L. & ECON. 337, 344–45 (1972) (noting that advertising correlates with lower 
prices). 
 119. THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 25 (citing Stephen Heffler et al., 
Health Spending Growth Up in 1999; Faster Growth Expected in The Future, 20 
HEALTH AFF. 193 (2001)); see also Angell, Relationships, supra note 8 
(explaining that DTCA promotes me-too drugs). 
 120. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Brienne T. Greiner, Tough Pill to Swallow: Does 
the First Amendment Prohibit WV from Regulating Pharmaceutical Companies’ 
Advertising Expenses to Lower the Cost of Prescription Drugs, 109 W. VA. L. 
REV. 107, 120–21 (2006). 
 121. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).  
 122. Greiner, supra note 120, at 123. 
 123. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
 124. Id. at 818 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 
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emphasized the protection of commercial speech with respect 
to prescription drugs in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.125  Writing for the 
majority, Justice Blackmun stated that “even if the First 
Amendment were thought to be primarily an instrument to 
enlighten public decision making in a democracy, we could 
not say that the free flow of information does not serve that 
goal.”126  Accordingly, economic motives are irrelevant and 
even “speech [that] does no more than propose a commercial 
transaction” receives First Amendment protection.127   
Simultaneously, the Court stressed that “[u]ntruthful speech, 
commercial or otherwise, has never been protected.” 128  
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent, however, astutely predicted the 
then-future problematic nature of DTCA that the majority 
had not anticipated.129 
In 1980, the Supreme Court provided a test to determine 
whether the government can regulate a particular instance of 
commercial speech.130  Specifically, the Central Hudson test 
states that protected speech must: (1) “concern lawful  
activity and not be misleading”; (2) concern a substantial 
“asserted governmental interest”; (3) “directly advance[]  
the governmental interest asserted”; and (4) “not [be]  
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”131  
U.S. 376, 384 (1973); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964)) (“The 
fact that the particular advertisement . . . had commercial aspects or reflected 
the advertiser’s commercial interests did not negate all First Amendment 
guarantees.”). 
 125. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748 (1976). 
 126. Id. at 765. 
 127. Id. at 762 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S. at 385) (stating that “we 
may assume that the advertiser’s interest is a purely economic one”). 
 128. Id. at 771. 
 129. Id. at 788 (“In the case of ‘our’ hypothetical pharmacist, he may now 
presumably advertise not only the prices of prescription drugs, but may attempt 
to energetically promote their sale so long as he does so truthfully.  Quite 
consistently with Virginia law requiring prescription drugs to be available only 
through a physician, ‘our’ pharmacist might run any of the following 
representative advertisements in a local newspaper: ‘Pain getting you down?  
Insist that your physician prescribe Demerol.  You pay a little more than for 
aspirin, but you get a lot more relief’  ‘Can’t shake the flu?  Get a prescription 
for Tetracycline from your doctor today.’  ‘Don’t spend another sleepless night. 
Ask your doctor to prescribe Seconal without delay.’ ” ). 
 130. Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 
U.S. 557 (1980). 
 131. Id. at 566. 
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Applying that test, in Thompson v. Western States Medical 
Center, the Court struck down a provision of the FDA 
Modernization Act that required physicians and pharmacists 
to refrain from advertising in order to compound a drug.132 
The Supreme Court remains steadfast in holding drug 
advertising constitutional and preventing states and 
Congress from regulating its content.  Most recently, in 
Sorrell v. IMS Health, the Court struck down a Vermont law 
restricting the sale, disclosure, and use of pharmacy records 
that reveal the prescribing practices of individual doctors.  In 
enacting this law, “Vermont articulated three objectives: 
avoiding harm to the public health associated with the 
overprescription of new drugs, controlling costs by stemming 
practices that promote expensive, branded drugs over 
generics, and protecting physicians’ privacy.”133  The Court 
found pharmaceutical data mining to be protected speech in 
aid of pharmaceutical advertising.134  The statute at issue in 
Sorrell imposed both content and speaker-based restrictions 
by prohibiting the sale of physician prescribing patterns to 
pharmaceutical manufacturers and detailers for marketing 
purposes, but allowing the sale of the same records to certain 
other entities.  While the Court determined heightened-
scrutiny to be the correct standard, it simultaneously held 
that the statute failed even under the intermediate Central 
Hudson test.  In another decision only days later, however, 
the Supreme Court held that all content-based restrictions 
trigger strict scrutiny,135 thereby leaving the exact level of 
scrutiny to be applied in future cases unclear.136 
 
 132. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 376–77 (2002); THAUL, 
CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 15–16 & n.51. 
 133. Michelle M. Mello & Noah A. Messing, Restrictions on the Use of 
Prescribing Data for Drug Promotion, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1248, 1248 (2011). 
 134. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2670–72 (2011). 
 135. Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011). 
 136. Mello & Messing, supra note 133, at 1250 (“[T]he term ‘heightened 
scrutiny’ is critical and pointedly ambiguous.  It might be a mere synonym for 
the midlevel scrutiny applied under the Central Hudson test — but it might 
mean far more.  In a prior opinion, Justice Kennedy cited First Amendment 
cases that applied ‘strict scrutiny,’ the most rigorous kind, as examples of 
‘heightened scrutiny,’ suggesting that he may have intended this meaning when 
he used the same term in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc. . . . Sorrell might thus 
portend that commercial speech will no longer receive lesser protection than 
political and social speech.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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In the wake of this ruling and as noted in Justice 
Breyer’s dissent, the Court has opened the gates to the 
possibility of striking down most FDA regulations since they 
generally discriminate based on conduct and speaker.137  For 
instance, off-label promotion by industry members, currently 
prohibited by FDA regulations faced a First Amendment 
challenge by Allergan several years ago.  While Allergan 
dropped the claim and that case ultimately settled,138 in light 
of Sorrell’s application of heightened scrutiny to content- and 
speaker-based regulations, the regulation would likely not 
survive today.  Thus, there are significant constitutional 
concerns with strong content-based limitations on DTCA.139 
II. DISCUSSION 
The problem with DTCA has “attracted enough 
congressional attention to warrant at least six bills in the 
110th Congress as well as concerns from members in the 
111th.”140  Among these bills is the Say No to Drug Ads Act, 
which aimed to alter the IRC such that “[n]o deduction shall 
be allowed . . . for any amount paid or incurred for a direct-to-
consumer advertisement of a prescription drug.”141  Part II 
evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of this particular 
strategy concerning DTCA. 
As Representative Daniel Lipinski, sponsor of one of the 
bills to revoke the DTCA tax deduction, said, “I am not 
looking to infringe upon any company’s right to advertise, 
only to help assure that the American taxpayers are not 
subsidizing these industries in our health care system.”142  By 
 137. See Kevin Outterson, Higher First Amendment Hurdles for Public 
Health Regulation, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. e13, e13(2) (2011); Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. 
at 2676–80 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 138. Settlement Agreement between United States, et al. and Allergan, Inc. ¶ 
19 (Sept. 1, 2010); see also Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Allergan 
Agrees to Plead Guilty and Pay $600 Million to Resolve Allegations of Off-Label 
Promotion of Botox, No. 10-988 (Sept. 1, 2010) available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/September/10-civ-988.html. 
 139. See Sax, supra note 79, at 216 (advocating to institute the content-based 
Truth in Marketing Act). 
 140. THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 1. 
 141. H.R. 2966, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 142. Lipinski Letter, supra note 15.  But see Walker, supra note 6, at 1251–
52 (arguing that “the disallowance on ‘public policy’ grounds of deductions . . . is 
best understood as a response to an appearance of subsidy” and noting that not 
all deductions are actually subsidies). 
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 102 Side A      04/16/2012   17:10:32
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 102 Side A      04/16/2012   17:10:32
 SPEISER/OUTTERSON FINAL 3/14/2012  4:32:02 PM 
2012]  DEDUCTIONS FOR DRUG ADS? 481 
allowing a tax deduction for DTCA, the government is 
reducing the cost of advertising and encouraging DTCA 
spending.143  “[The pharmaceutical companies] already have 
plenty of incentives to spend that money . . . . As Congress 
looks for ways to repair our health care system, this is one 
simple reform that ought not to be overlooked.”144 
Increasing the financial burden on industry marketing 
may reduce the frequency and enhance the accuracy of DTCA 
content since there will be a greater monetary loss  
to companies when they are forced to cease broad- 
casting a misleading ad. 145   The recent Pfizer marketing 
abuse resulting in a multibillion-dollar fine further supports 
the need to encourage accurate advertising from the outset.146  
Moreover, eliminating the DTCA tax deduction would not 
prevent the pharmaceutical industry, ranked by Fortune 
magazine as one of the top thirty most profitable indus- 
tries in 2009,147 from advertising.148  Thus, any benefits from 
advertising would be maintained while decreasing negative 
effects. 
Removing the tax deduction would not cease all DTCA by 
creating a practical barrier.  Rather, the removal would serve 
three main purposes.  First, it would signal Congressional 
unwillingness to subsidize DTCA through the Tax Code.  
 143. See Walker, supra note 6, at 1251–52 (arguing that “the disallowance on 
‘public policy’ grounds of deductions . . . is best understood as a response to an 
appearance of subsidy” and noting that not all deductions are actually 
subsidies). 
 144. Lipinski Introduces Bill to End Tax Break for Marketing and 
Advertising By Drug Companies, CONGRESSMAN DAN LIPINSKI (June 17, 2009), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20110406164620/http://www.lipinski.house.gov/index
.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=917&Itemid=9 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 145. Cf. The distortions to the healthcare market as a result of insurance 
such that consumers do not fully appreciate the cost of their decisions. 
 146. Gardiner Harris, Pfizer Pays $2.3 Billion to Settle Marketing Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 2, 2009, at B4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2009/09/03/business/03health.html; see also Kesselheim, supra note 98, at 1486. 
 147. Global 500 2009: Top Performers — Fast Growing Industries: Growth in 
Revenues, CNNMONEY, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2009 
/performers/industries/fastgrowers/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2011) (ranking the 
pharmaceutical industry number six in growth in profits and number twenty-
seven in growth in revenue). 
 148. See, e.g., Lipinski Letter, supra note 15 (explaining that pharmaceutical 
companies earn approximately $4.20 for each dollar spent on advertising and 
“neither need nor deserve to have their marketing expenditures subsidized by 
taxpayers”). 
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Second, making advertising more expensive would alter the 
drug companies’ cost-benefit analysis as to how much money 
to spend on DTCA, likely leading them to cut back and reduce 
the overall quantity of DTCA.  Third, the removal of the 
deductions may find favor with the public by resulting in 
increased revenue of approximately $37 billion over ten 
years.149 
A. Revocation of Tax Deductions is Constitutional 
Even in the wake of the Supreme Court’s recent decision 
in Sorrell, which “expand[ed] the First Amendment’s reach 
and power to strike down government regulation of health 
care information[,]”150 revocation of the deductions for DTCA 
remains constitutionally viable.  As Justice Kennedy noted in 
writing for the majority, Sorrell did not alter the proposition 
that “a State may choose to regulate price advertising in one 
industry but not in others, because the risk of fraud . . . is in 
its view greater there.”151   Rather, the Court focused on 
content- and speaker-based restrictions in access to or use  
of information.  Unlike the Vermont statute in Sorrell,152 
revocation of the deductions for DTCA does not impose a 
content- or viewpoint-based restriction since it neither affects 
the industry’s use of, or access to, information nor pertains to 
the content of its advertisements.  Drug manufacturers can 
still publish the exact same advertisements that could be 
published with a deduction.  Conversely, imposing a direct 
regulation on truthful, non-misleading DTCA would not likely 
survive a First Amendment challenge. 
Revoking the deductions also does not impose speaker-
based discrimination since it would apply to all DTCA, 
regardless of the person or entity engaging in the practice or 
his motivation.  While the revocation may have the effect of 
discriminating based on speaker since only pharmaceutical 
manufacturers engage in DTCA, the revocation does not  
 149. Rich Thomaselli, Industry Mobilizes to Fight Off Congress’ $37 Billion 
Ad Tax, ADVERTISING AGE (June 22, 2009), http://adage.com/article/news/big-
pharma-media-cos-4a-s-defend-threat-dtc/137476/. 
 150. Outterson, supra note 137, at e13(1). 
 151. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011) (citing R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 388–89 (1992)). 
 152. Id. at 2663 (“Vermont’s law . . . has the effect of preventing detailers—
and only detailers—from communicating with physicians in an effective and 
informative manner.”). 
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involve the facial discrimination apparent in the Vermont 
statute. 
Another reason to differentiate DTCA from the data 
mining at issue in Sorrell is that data mining provides  
useful, educational information to doctors.153  While DTCA 
also purports to educate, it targets consumers whose 
protection presents a greater concern to the court.  As Kevin 
Outterson explained in his recent article in the New England 
Journal of Medicine, the Sorrell Court also indicated that the 
constitutional standard applied to regulations aimed at 
protecting consumers might be more relaxed.154  According to 
Outterson, this means that: 
FDA regulation of [DTCA] could be given more leeway 
than marketing to physicians, especially if medical 
education programs focused on helping physicians 
evaluate such claims. Similarly, more leeway could be 
given under special circumstances, such as if the FDA 
restricted [DTCA] as part of a Risk Evaluation and 
Mitigation Strategy.155 
While Congress cannot limit protected speech, they are 
not required to ease its financial burden.  In Bob Jones 
University v. United States, the Supreme Court noted that 
“[i]n an area as complex as the tax system, the agency 
Congress vests with administrative responsibility must be 
able to exercise its authority to meet changing conditions and 
new problems.”156  It is “well established that Congress is not 
required to subsidize the exercise of constitutional rights 
through the allowance of tax deductions, and may withdraw 
such subsidies if it chooses to do so.”157  Tax deductions are 
 153. Id. at 2683 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Mello & Messing, supra note 133, at 
1251. 
 154. Outterson, supra note 137, at e13(2) (“The First Amendment directs us 
to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for 
what the government perceives to be their own good . . . . These precepts apply 
with full force when the audience, in this case prescribing physicians, consists of 
‘sophisticated and experienced’ consumers.” (quoting Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 
2671)). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 596 (1983). 
 157. Brief for Appellee at 28, Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (No. 99-5097), 1999 WL 34835366 (citing Regan v. Taxation 
With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 545–46 (1983); Cammarano v. 
United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959)) (discussing tax deduction and 
exceptions).  Also consider, Congress’ removal of lobbying, a protected speech, 
from the class of deductible ordinary and necessary business expenses under 
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matters of legislative grace158 and Congress “[u]nquestionably 
. . . has the power to condition, limit, or deny deductions.”159 
For instance, the IRC specifically exempts deductions for 
certain political expenditures, despite First Amendment 
implications.160  This section also differentiates between local 
and non-local legislation.  Note, however, that Congress 
would not be permitted to revoke deductions only for a 
particular political party.  Such a restriction would be an 
impermissible speaker- and content-based restriction under 
Sorrell.161  The IRC also excludes deductions for expenses 
related to a redemption, certain passive real estate 
investments, net capital losses in excess of three thousand 
dollars, certain group health plans, and stock reacquisition, to 
name just a few.162  Most importantly, Congress has exempted 
certain foreign advertising expenses from the category of 
deductible expenses.163  In Bob Jones University, the Supreme 
Court held that Congress had the power to revoke tax 
deductions on the basis of racial discrimination.164 
The Supreme Court, however, has held that preventing 
companies from spending money on protected speech violates 
the First Amendment.165  In First National Bank of Boston v. 
Bellotti, the Court struck down a Massachusetts state law 
criminalizing contributions or expenditures by certain 
corporations for the purpose of influencing a vote.166  The 
the IRC remains constitutional in the wake of the Bellotti decision.  I.R.C. § 
162(e) (2006); see also First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 
(1978). 
 158. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 162 (2006); Bob Jones Univ., 461 at 574 (approving 
removal of tax exempt status); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 
440 (1934); Knight v. Commissioner, 552 U.S. 181, 192 (2008) (“noting the 
familiar rule that an income tax deduction is a matter of legislative grace” 
(citing INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992) (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
 159. Helvering v. Indep. Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 381 (1934). 
 160. I.R.C. § 162(e). 
 161. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011) (finding that the 
Vermont Law violates the First Amendment since “[t]he State’s interest in 
burdening the speech of detailers . . . turns on nothing more than a difference of 
opinion”). 
 162. I.R.C. § 162(k), (l). 
 163. I.R.C. § 162(j). 
 164. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 585 (1983); see also 
Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943). 
 165. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978). 
 166. Id. at 765.  The Court also explained that the lower court erred in 
holding that “First Amendment rights of a corporation are limited to issues that 
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Bellotti Court stressed the importance of the “exacting 
scrutiny” applied to “legislative prohibition[s] . . . directed at 
speech itself and speech on a public issue” since the  
First Amendment protects speech regardless of the source.167  
Indeed, the Supreme Court drew particular attention  
to advertising, reaffirming its holding in Virginia State  
Board of Pharmacy.168  Specifically, the Court noted that “[a] 
commercial advertisement is constitutionally protected . . . 
because it furthers the societal interest in the ‘free flow of 
commercial information.’ ” 169  Congress has no authority to 
limit protected speech.170   While the removal of the tax 
deductions may increase the cost of advertising and thereby 
reduce its prevalence, it does not prevent manufacturers from 
spending money to exercise their First Amendment right. 
Recently, the Supreme Court issued a decision 
“reflect[ing] its willingness to expand significantly the 
justifications for regulating campaign financing, the  
First Amendment   notwithstanding.”171  Professor Richard 
Briffault172 observed that the Court reframed the issue of 
regulating the finances away from “a threat to freedoms of 
speech and association and therefore a challenge to 
constitutional values . . . [instead] giv[ing] great weight to the 
interests in fair, informed democratic decision-making it 
found to be advanced[.]”173  This reasoning for increasing 
regulations should similarly apply to DTCA.  Rather than 
promote, DTCA, facilitated by tax deductions, hinders the 
free flow of information.  DTCA influences consumers to 
pressure their over-burdened doctor whose reasoning cannot 
materially affect is [sic] business, property, or assets.”  Id. at 767.  Even if the 
protections were limited to this subset, pharmaceutical advertising would still 
be allowed.  This Article, however, discusses this case to emphasize that the 
amount of money a corporation may spend on advertising cannot be restricted. 
 167. Id. at 766. 
 168. Id. at 765–66. 
 169. Id. at 783. 
 170. Id. at 784–85. 
 171. Gregg D. Polsky & Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Regulating Section 527 
Organizations, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1000, 1002 (2005) (discussing McConnell 
v. FEC). 
 172. Professor Briffault is the Vice Dean and Joseph P. Chamberlain 
Professor of Legislation at Columbia Law School. 
 173. Polsky & Charles, supra note 171, at 1002 n.19 (citing Richard Briffault, 
McConnell v. FEC and the Transformation of Campaign Finance Law, 3 
ELECTION L.J. 147, 148 (2004)). 
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compete with the alluring ads to prescribe a more expensive 
medicine.174 
B.  Policy 
1. Negative Effects of DTCA 
In their comments on the 2004 FDA DTCA draft 
guidance, FTC noted “the important role that DTC 
advertising can play in keeping consumers better- 
informed about their healthcare and treatment options.”175  
FTC highlighted the importance of providing consumers with 
risk information they can easily understand and “improv[ing] 
the facilitation of truthful, non-misleading information.”176  
Thus, FTC implicitly recognizes that DTCA, in its current 
state, fails to promote public welfare as demonstrated by the 
industry’s repeated violations of FDA guidance.177 
Improving consumer knowledge by providing information 
through DTCA is an honorable, yet impractical, aspiration.  
Drug companies often provide technically accurate 
information framed to mislead viewers.178  The general public 
 174. See, e.g., Patrick Cohoon, An Answer to the Question Why the Time Has 
Come to Abrogate the Learned Intermediary Rule in the Case of Direct-to-
Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 1333, 1357 
(2001) (“There is no justification for concluding that DTC advertising does not 
interfere with the doctor-patient relationship.”); Terzian, supra note 3, at 158 
(“Moreover, industry critics of DTC advertisements argue that the 
advertisements distort doctor-patient relationships and may actually increase 
the use of prescription drugs.”); David C. Vladeck, The Difficult Case of Direct to 
Consumer Drug Advertising, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 259, 284 (2007) (stating that 
“doctors often succumb to patient pressure, or patients ‘doctor-shop’ until they 
find a doctor willing to write the prescription the patient wants” and that 
“[m]edical organizations generally see DTC ads as a threat to the doctor-patient 
relationship for just that reason”). 
 175. BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., BUREAU OF ECON. & OFFICE OF POLICY 
PLANNING OF THE FTC, DOCKET NO. 2004D-0042, IN THE MATTER OF REQUEST 
FOR COMMENTS ON AGENCY DRAFT GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS REGARDING 
CONSUMER-DIRECTED PROMOTION 13 (2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/ 
2004/05/040512dtcdrugscomment.pdf (emphasis added). 
 176. Id. 
 177. See sources cited supra notes 11, 73, 83, 146. 
 178. See, e.g., Lipinski Letter, supra note 15 (“In health care reform we 
should be striving to provide consumers with more information, but this 
information should be unbiased information that gives a clear understanding of 
the choices available to them.”); see also Terzian, supra note 3, at 165 
(explaining that “even though DTC advertisements may be technically truthful, 
these advertisements mislead consumers because consumers lack the 
specialized knowledge needed to evaluate the information effectively”); 
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with no medical training cannot fully appreciate the 
implications of a particular drug as presented by the 
pharmaceutical companies.179  An FDA survey revealed that 
75% of patients overestimate drug’s efficacy based on 
DTCA.180  Many viewers assume that advertisements are 
preapproved and all advertised drugs are “completely safe.”181  
DTCA generally does not list alternate treatment options or 
include the full list of potential side effects and consumers 
typically lack the independent knowledge to appreciate an ad 
in its proper context. 
Despite the instruction to viewers in every broadcast ad 
to consult additional sources for the full list of side effects, 
consumers are unlikely to comply.  Rather than rationally 
process the information that should be relevant, consumers 
respond to the images designed to evoke a positive association 
in the consumer’s mind.  Alternatively, the ads sometimes 
aim to incite fear in the viewer to make the viewer believe 
that a relatively minor problem is a serious problem requiring 
immediate attention.  Regardless of the marketing strategy, 
DTCA consistently emphasizes the drug’s benefits to 
outweigh the side effects. 
Accordingly, some argue that DTCA creates a “disease 
mongering” problem whereby patients decide they have the 
problem mentioned in an ad (e.g. restless leg syndrome) and 
request the miracle cure from their doctor.182  This increases 
prescription drug use, and consequently, the cost of health 
care, but does not lead to a healthier population.183  When 
Lenhardt, Why So Glum?, supra note 92, at 167–68. 
 179. See Davis, supra note 40, at 863–64. 
 180. KATHRYN J. AIKIN ET AL., PATIENT AND PHYSICIAN ATTITUDES AND 
BEHAVIORS ASSOCIATED WITH DTC PROMOTION OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: 
SUMMARY OF FDA SURVEY RESEARCH RESULTS 8 (2004), cited in Vladeck, supra 
note 174. 
 181. THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 26.  Cf. DTC Prescription Drug 
Advertising, supra note 114. 
 182. Susan Heylman, Widely Advertised ‘Restless Legs’ Drugs Move into 
Court, 44 TRIAL 14, 14, 16 (2008) (explaining disease mongering and that while 
Consumer Reports, for example, has identified restless leg syndrome as an 
example of disease mongering, it is a real disease according to the National 
Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke); see also Moynihan et al., Selling 
Sickness, supra note 4, at 886. 
 183. Ray Moynihan & David Henry, The Fight Against Disease Mongering: 
Generating Knowledge for Action, Public Library of Science, 3 PUB. LIBR. SCI. 
MED. e191, e191 (2006), available at http://collections.plos.org/plosmedicine/pdf/ 
plme-03-04-diseasemongering.pdf. 
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doctors inappropriately prescribe medication, drug companies 
are shielded from blame by claiming the prescribing 
physician as a “learned intermediary” with the “ultimate 
responsibility for prescribing drugs.”184 
While “many physicians believe that educated patients 
are easier to treat and care for,” few “believe that DTC  
advertisements are educationally effective.”185  Rather than 
promoting productive communications between doctors and 
patients, DTCA “create[s] unreasonable or inappropriate 
patient expectations for product effectiveness and often lead 
patients to request inappropriate products for their medical 
needs.”186  “Physicians may relent to patient pressure, even if 
it is not in the [patient’s] best interest.”187  One survey found 
that physicians prescribe the advertised and requested drug 
39% of the time despite not “believ[ing it is] the  
best medical—or economic—option.”188  In many cases, the 
providers felt another drug would have been equally effective, 
and in some cases, the physicians even stated that they 
believed that a different course of action would have been 
more beneficial.189  For instance, doctors frequently prescribed 
the heavily-advertised Claritin despite it working only 11% 
better than a placebo and the existence of other more effective 
 184. Joel S. Weissman et al., Physicians Report on Patient Encounters 
Involving Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, HEALTH AFF., W4-226 (Apr. 28, 2004), 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2004/04/28/hlthaff.w4.219.short); 
Pines, DTC History, supra note 37, at 515; Terzian, supra note 3, at 161 (“The 
learned intermediary doctrine holds that an adequate warning by a prescribing 
physician discharges a manufacturer’s duty to warn.”)  However, as seen in 
Edwards v. Basel Pharmaceuticals, the doctrine does not shield manufacturers 
from potential liability when the FDA mandates a direct warning to patients.  
Terzian, supra note 3, at 162. 
 185. Terzian, supra note 3, at 158. 
 186. Id.; see also Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs of the Am. Med. Ass’n, 
Direct-to-Consumer Advertisements of Prescription Drugs, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
119, 122–23 (2000) (noting that the American Medical Association believes that 
DTCA causes a time burden on physicians). 
 187. Terzian, supra note 3, at 157; see also Angell, Relationships, supra note 
8 (explaining that doctors may go along with prescribing the requested medicine 
since it is easier than suggesting an alternate course of treatment). 
 188. THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 24. 
 189. Id. (citing Joel S. Weissman et al., Physicians Report on Patient 
Encounters Involving Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, HEALTH AFF., W4-226 
(Apr. 28, 2004), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2004/04/28/ 
hlthaff.w4.219.short); see also Angell, Relationships, supra note 8 (explaining 
that “adverts are mostly for me-too drugs and are designed to convince viewers 
that one is better than another, despite the fact that these drugs are seldom 
compared in clinical trials at equivalent doses”). 
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medications. 190   In the event that the doctor refuses to 
prescribe the drug, the patient may just doctor-shop until he 
finds one who will comply with his demand.  Refusal to 
prescribe may also generate tension between the doctor and 
the patient, who does not understand the rationale, thereby 
placing a strain on the doctor-patient relationship in which 
trust and honesty are critical.191  Thus, industry “may be 
creating demand where there is no need and thereby harming 
the doctor-patient relationship.”192 
The FDA’s use of the same regulatory standard for  
DTCA and physician advertising also presents a problem.193  
Doctors, by virtue of their basic professional requirements, 
may consider drug advertising in context and better 
comprehend risk information and research further.194  As a 
third party, the physician will not experience the same 
emotional response as the patient.  Despite the continuing 
medical education requirements, keeping up with the latest 
advances in the ever-evolving medical field presents a 
challenge for doctors.  Thus, drug detailing alerting doctors to 
a new treatment option may serve as a useful additional 
means of keeping doctors current.195  DTCA, on the other 
 190. THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 25. 
 191. Terzian, supra note 3, at 157. 
 192. Id. at 165. 
 193. But see Schwartz, Viability, supra note 36, at 350 (arguing that 
“[b]ecause DTC marketing of prescription drugs has not fundamentally altered 
the playing field, traditional rules of law should remain fully viable”). 
 194. But see Lenhardt, Why So Glum?, supra note 92, at 166 (arguing that 
doctors are sometimes unknowingly deceived by DTCA).  Additionally, 
physicians are human and some are persuaded by the perks offered by the drug 
companies, and some are unavoidably influenced by the inundation of the 
pharmaceutical representatives who flood their offices, a practice known as 
detailing.  Accordingly, there is currently a rising concern with detailing and an 
increased focus on attempting to institute academic detailing which involves 
unbiased sources providing doctors with summaries of the best treatments with 
a focus on quality and a consideration of costs.  For a more detailed discussion, 
please see Mark Navin, Program to Inform Doctors about Drugs at Risk, RADIO 
BOSTON (Jan. 8, 2010), http://www.radioboston.org/2010/01/08/program-to-
inform-doctors-about-drugs-at-risk/. 
 195. Advertising to physicians is still problematic and academic detailing 
should be implemented to replace pharmaceutical advertising to physicians.  
See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011) (explaining 
detailing as a process through which pharmaceutical salespersons, generally 
armed with background information on the physician’s prescribing patterns, to 
persuade the physician to prescribe a particular drug).  “Detailers bring drug 
samples as well as medical studies that explain the ‘details’ and potential 
advantages of various prescription drugs.  Interested physicians listen, ask 
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hand, targets patients who lack the specialized knowledge to 
comprehend and appropriately weigh a drug’s risks and 
benefits.196 
Yet, currently the government appears more focused on 
the undue influence of the industry on doctors rather  
than consumers.  Recently, Congress enacted the Physician 
Payment Sunshine Act, which requires, among other things, 
drug companies to disclose gifts and payments to doctors,  
as Congress believes they generate conflicts of interest  
and biases.197  While industry influence over the medical 
profession presents legitimate concerns, it should not be the 
sole legislative focus. 
DTCA also results in increased healthcare spending since 
only the brand drugs advertise and the adverting  
reduces consumer price sensitivity.198  Even when a consumer 
requests and receives a medically necessary drug as a result 
of DTCA, the ad often leads to wasteful spending by 
convincing patients they need the brand name drug, when a 
cheaper generic would be equally effective.199  This effect is 
magnified by the fact that most consumers have health 
insurance and thus do not absorb the full cost of the drug.  
Accordingly, the irrational preference for brand over generic 
drug is another way in which DTCA increases unnecessary 
healthcare spending. 
Allowing an advertising tax deduction also incentivizes 
the industry to invest additional resources in advertising to 
increase the life and profitability of their existing drugs 
rather than invest in research and development for new 
drugs.200  The patent system already provides drug companies 
with incentives to create drugs by allowing exclusivity periods 
for the first drug manufacturer to get a New Drug Application 
questions, and receive follow-up [sic] data.”  Id. 
 196. Terzian, supra note 3, at 165. 
 197. S. 301, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 3138, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 198. See generally John A. Rizzo, Advertising and Competition in the Ethical 
Pharmaceutical Industry: The Case of Antihypertensive Drugs, 42 J.L. & ECON. 
89, 89–91 (1999) (primary effect of advertising drugs is to reduce consumer price 
sensitivity). 
 199. THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 1. 
 200. See, e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim et. al., Extensions of Intellectual Property 
Rights and Delayed Adoption of Generic Drugs: Effects on Medicaid Spending, 
25 HEALTH AFF. 1637, 1638 (2006) (explaining the pharmaceutical 
manufacturers’ practice of using various tactics to extend the life of their 
existing “blockbuster” drugs known as “evergreening”). 
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and the first generic drug to get an Abbreviated New Drug 
Application.  Accordingly, these exclusivity periods, put in 
place to encourage research and development, allow the 
industry to profit from the drugs they make.  Yet incentives 
are misaligned when more money is spent on administrative 
costs than research and development.  Thus, removing the 
tax deduction may help shift the incentives from encouraging 
companies to invest in prolonging the profitability of existing 
drugs to investing the money into new drugs.201 
2. Lobbying 
Unlike DTCA, Congress specifically exempts most 
lobbying from the deductible category of “ordinary and 
necessary business expenses.”202  Like advertising, the First 
Amendment and several Supreme Court decisions limit 
Congress’ ability to regulate lobbying. 203   Nevertheless, 
Congress removed the tax deductions for lobbying as a means 
of regulating and limiting the activity to “reduc[e the] 
possible nefarious effects.”204  The line of reasoning applied by 
Congress to the allowance and removal of the deductions for 
lobbying expenses, and grassroots lobbying specifically, also 
applies to DTCA.205 
Originally, Congress recognized lobbying expenses as 
included within the IRC’s definition of ordinary and 
necessary business expenses and permitted their deduction.206  
Like advertising, Congress observed that permitting the 
deduction for lobbying “would improve the flow of 
information.”207  In spite of that belief, Congress did not find 
 201. Terzian, supra note 3, at 165 (stating that critics of DTCA “argue that 
the money spent on expensive television advertising could be better spent on 
research and development of products, or to reduce the price of pharmaceutical 
products, thereby promotion public health and welfare”). 
 202. Mayer, Lobbying, supra note 28, at 495.  For a discussion of the 
definition of lobbying in the tax context and exactly what is and is not included, 
see generally id. at 508–18. 
 203. See id. at 492. 
 204. Id. at 492–96, 507–08, 517–18. 
 205. Cf. id. at 492–96. 
 206. See id. at 498 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 87-1447, at 17 (1962)). 
 207. Mayer, Lobbying, supra note 28, at 498 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 87-1447, at 
17; S. REP. NO. 87-1881, at 24 (1962)).  They also noted that this “would reduce 
the administrative burden.”  Mayer, Lobbying, supra note 28, at 498.  But see 
infra Part II.D (discussing how removing tax deductions does not necessarily 
substantially increase administrative burdens). 
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value in extending deductibility to grassroots lobbying that 
targets the public to assist with lobbying activities.208  That 
distinction implicitly recognized the susceptibility of the 
general public to persuasion on topics about which they likely 
have little base knowledge.  If Congress, however, attempted 
to distinguish between deductible and non-deductible 
lobbying based on the identity of the speaker or the content of 
the lobbying, that would violate the First Amendment under 
Sorrell.209 
Additionally, Congress did not extend the revocation of 
the deductibility of lobbying expenses to charities, 
distinguishing between those who stand to profit from their 
efforts and  those  who  do  not.210   This reflects Congress’ 
concern for both influence over the public and the actors’ 
motivation in attempting to influence.  Despite the 
importance of prescription drugs, the pharmaceutical 
industry is not in the same class as charities.  Thus, the 
DTCA tax deductions could similarly be revoked.211 
C. Increased FDA Regulations as an Alternative Solution 
The FDA, the agency in charge of regulating DTCA under 
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, should be the 
appropriate agency to implement changes to the current 
system and solve the DTCA problem.  If indeed DTCA is 
misleading or not truthful, then the FDA has ample 
constitutional room to regulate it.  FDA, however, has failed 
to rise to the challenge of sufficiently regulating DTCA and 
has left legislators concerned with current DTCA practices 
and searching for a solution.212  This failure stems from two 
major roadblocks: 1) the FDA lacks the necessary funding and 
resources; and 2) the FDA would have difficulty specifically 
identifying non-truthful or misleading speech, and therefore 
 208. Mayer, Lobbying, supra note 28, at 498–99. 
 209. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2670–72 (2011). 
 210. Mayer, Lobbying, supra note 28, at 517 (“Congress felt that charities 
were more likely to exercise their influence in a positive way, particularly with 
respect to providing information to government actors and to the public.”); see 
also I.R.C. § 162(e)(3) (2006). 
 211. For example, the potential for disease mongering and the potential 
negative impact on the doctor-patient relationship.  See Moynihan & Henry, 
supra note 183, at e191; Terzian, supra note 3, at 158. 
 212. See, e.g., ANGELL, THE TRUTH, supra note 9, at 124 (“Obviously, given 
the nature of the ads we’re subjected to, the [FDA] fails at [its] job.”). 
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would face practical difficulties in constitutionally increasing 
DTCA content regulation.  FDA requires an average of forty-
five days to review ads once they air.213  A 2006 Government 
Accounting Office (GAO) report indicated that sometimes by 
the time FDA issues a warning on a misleading ad, its 
publication has already concluded.214   Even when the FDA 
condemns an ad and the company ceases publication of the 
misleading ad, during the lag time inevitably some viewers 
saw the original advertisement and will either not see or 
disregard, the corrected version. 215   Further, in a 2009 
Congressional Research Service report, the problem was 
recognized specifically in an area in which the FDA already 
has authority, but has failed to utilize.216  The FDA lacks the 
manpower to review every advertisement prior to public 
viewing or to create a user fee program.217  FDA staffing has 
not kept pace with the increase in number of drugs or 
advertisements. 218   As a result, in 2004, the FDA only 
reviewed approximately 32% of advertisements submitted 
before airing.219 
Following the passing of the Food and Drug 
Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA), on March 
14, 2007, then FDA Commissioner Andrew C. von 
Eschenbach issued a statement including a discussion of “a 
new program to assess fees for advisory reviews of DTC 
television advertisements.” 220   In addressing the concerns 
 213. THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 13. 
 214. Schwartz, Viability, supra note 36, at 348. 
 215. Tim Kelly & John Busbice, Measuring the Effectiveness of DTC 
Advertising, 18 PRODUCT MGMT. TODAY 20, 21 (2007) (“TV advertising drives a 
sharp increase in new therapy starts for the first week or two after exposure 
and a more gradual increase in cumulative total prescriptions through week 
36.”). 
 216. THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 27–29. 
 217. Cf. 21 U.S.C.A. § 353b (West 2010) (“The Secretary may require the 
submission of any television advertisement for a drug.”) (emphasis added). 
 218. See Donohue, A Decade of DTCA, supra note 74, at 679 (“[T]he number 
of staff members who are dedicated to reviewing advertisements has remained 
relatively stable, whereas the use of such advertising has grown substantially.  
In 2002, three FDA staff members were dedicated to reviewing direct-to-
consumer advertisements.  In 2004, four staffers were reviewing such 
advertisements, even though spending on this form of advertising (and probably 
the volume of ads to review) had increased by 45%, from $2.9 billion to $4.2 
billion.”). 
 219. Id. 
 220. Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, 110th 
Cong. 7 (2007) [hereinafter Eschenbach statement] (statement of Andrew C. von 
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regarding the imbalance of risk and benefit information 
provided in DTCA, companies’ ability to submit ads for 
review, and the industry’s awareness of the benefits of the 
optional review, von Eschenbach also noted the FDA’s 
increasing workload and the lack of a corresponding increase 
in staff.221  As a solution, von Eschenbach proposed 
instituting a program where companies volunteering to have 
their ads reviewed by FDA would pay a user fee which would 
be used to “increase[] FDA resources to allow for . . . timely 
review . . . and ensure FDA input[.]”222  FDA anticipated that 
these fees would generate several million in revenue and 
enable them to hire twenty-seven new employees to review 
ads.223  Under this arrangement, companies could get FDA 
approval prior to broadcasting their ads and thus not risk 
enforcement action against them. 
On January 3, 2008, however, the Federal Register 
printed a notice that the “User Fee Program for Advisory 
Review of Direct-to-Consumer Television Advertisements for 
Prescription Drug and Biological Products; Program Will Not 
Be Implemented[.]”224  As a result, the FDA concluded that in 
lieu of a user fee, “[a]dvertisements voluntarily submitted for 
FDA review will be reviewed in as timely a manner as 
resources permit.”225  Since the FDA by its own admission is 
incapable of reviewing the ads in a timely manner, few 
companies are likely to voluntarily submit ads.226 
This failure of the law may not be quite as large a 
deficiency as it appears.  First, the proposal was merely 
voluntary and thus would not solve the compliance 
problem.227  Second, the program would require significant 
resources to merely obtain a non-legally-binding FDA 
Eschenbach, Comm’r, Food & Drug Admin.). 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 8. 
 223. Id. 
 224. User Fee Program for Advisory Review of Direct-to-Consumer Television 
Advertisements for Prescription Drug and Biological Products; Program Will 
Not Be Implemented, 73 Fed. Reg. 2924 (Jan. 16, 2008). 
 225. Id. 
 226. Eschenbach statement, supra note 220, at 7 (“As a result, it is 
impossible for FDA to review all of the DTC television advertisement advisory 
submissions it receives in a timely manner.”). 
 227. User Fee Program for Advisory Review of Direct-to-Consumer Television 
Advertisements for Prescription Drug and Biological Products; Program Will 
Not Be Implemented, 73 Fed. Reg. at 2924. 
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recommendation.  Third, not even the FDA believed that the 
program would have received the $11 million necessary to 
make the undertaking worthwhile.228  Finally, the FDA would 
also face First Amendment limits, as noted above, on its 
ability to regulate the content of the ads. 
In an August 6, 2009 speech, FDA Commissioner 
Margaret Hamburg acknowledged a “steep decline in the 
FDA’s enforcement activity over the past several years.”229  
Not surprisingly, the violations which “have gone 
unaddressed for far too long” include misleading 
advertising.230  As Hamburg noted, “[t]hese delays do not 
result from a lack of commitment by FDA career staff.”231  
FDA has recently demonstrated its promised commitment to 
enforcement of existing regulations by issuing more warning 
letters.232  These efforts and good intentions, however, are 
insufficient.  In light of its increased authority in recent 
years, the overburdened-FDA simply does not possess the 
means or funds to increase its enforcement power in order to 
make a substantial impact on the current situation.233 
According to a January 2010 article, Thomas Abrams, 
Director of the Division of Drug Marketing, Advertising and 
Communications, reported that “[o]ver the last five years, the 
[FDA] has increased the number of people monitoring ads by 
50% to 60% in an effort to keep” pace with advertising.234  
Some may argue that the 4.7% decrease of DTCA in the first 
three quarters of 2009, compared to the previous year, 
indicates the FDA’s increased enforcement is already helping 
reduce the frequency of DTCA.  The trend, however, can more 
likely be attributed to the current financial crisis and 
companies’ reluctance to spend money.235 
 228. See id. 
 229. Margaret A. Hamburg, Comm’r, U.S. Food & Drugs Admin., Remarks on 
“Effective Enforcement and Benefits to Public Health” at Food and Drug Law 
Institute (Aug. 6, 2009) [hereinafter Hamburg, Remarks], available at 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/ucm175983.htm. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Pettypiece, supra note 54 (“As a result, the agency issued 41 warning 
letters to drug makers, or almost double the number in 2008.”). 
 233. FDA expanded authority by the Bioterrorism Act of 2002 and Food and 
Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA) of 2007. 
 234. Pettypiece, supra note 54. 
 235. Id. (noting the decrease in advertising spending and that “the recession 
has been partly to blame”). 
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Thus, there are problems with various aspects of the 
current DTCA regulation, which either cannot or will not be 
remedied by FDA action.  Practical constraints prevent the 
FDA from serving as a realistic, practical, or sufficient 
solution to the DTCA problem.  Any change to the FDA’s 
responsibility would not only increase their responsibility, but 
also decrease available funds and resources for other 
programs.  Moreover, constitutional concerns frustrate 
attempts to strengthen FDA regulation of DTCA content. 
D. Disincentivizing DTCA Through the IRC Would Not 
Cause an Administrative Burden 
Instituting an ex-ante user fee imposed through the FDA 
would accomplish the same goals, but would increase the 
FDA’s work and responsibilities.  Conversely, removing the 
tax deductions would not entail increasing the IRS’ budget, 
resources, or responsibility, but would still raise revenue.236  
As some scholars have pointed out, a benefit of instituting a 
disincentive through tax penalties in the IRC is low 
administrative cost.237  The taxable status of advertising is 
already at issue in the IRC and this approach is clearly 
feasible since its treatment varies among of different types of 
advertising. 238   Also, for the targeted companies, the 
complexity will be small, especially considering the billions to 
be received.  As a result of the low administrative cost, the 
IRC “includes numerous provisions that discourage particular 
non-tax behaviors.” 239   For instance, IRC section 162(m) 
imposes a tax penalty on certain executive salaries instead of 
having another agency directly regulate. 
 
 236. See Lipinski Letter, supra note 15 (“Each year pharmaceutical 
companies spend nearly $18 billion for advertising, marketing, and promotion of 
prescription drugs, and the tax deduction these companies receive amounts to 
$6.3 billion a year according to the Congressional Research Service.”). 
 237. See, e.g., Weisbach & Nussim, Tax and Spending, supra note 20, at 958; 
Walker, supra note 6, at 1259–60 (explaining that under Eric Zolt’s analysis of 
tax penalties, the low administrative costs “offset the crudeness of the 
incentives provided”).   
 238. See I.R.C. § 162 (2006) (allowing a deduction for advertising in some 
instances, such as DTCA, but not allowing certain other instances, including 
certain foreign advertising). 
 239. Walker, supra note 6 (including several examples of tax disincentives 
and stating that the effect of these “provisions is to raise the effective cost of—
and to discourage—the disfavored activity”); see also I.R.C. § 162. 
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 110 Side A      04/16/2012   17:10:32
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 110 Side A      04/16/2012   17:10:32
 SPEISER/OUTTERSON FINAL 3/14/2012  4:32:02 PM 
2012]  DEDUCTIONS FOR DRUG ADS? 497 
For this reason, the removal of the deductions for DTCA 
has been widely supported as demonstrated by the proposed 
legislation and arguments from scholars.  For instance, the 
2009 CRS Report suggested removing the tax deduction for 
advertising as a means of “[m]ak[ing] DTC Advertising [l]ess 
[p]rofitable to [i]ndustry” which would thereby reduce the 
overall level of DTC.240  As one scholar argues, the Tax Code 
serves as a logical first place for Congress to attempt to 
regulate lobbying since it “requires spending money, and 
when money is spent, there is always the question of how to 
treat those expenditures for tax purposes.”241  Alternatively, 
“[p]utting a program into the tax system makes the tax 
system look more complicated, but there is unseen 
simplification elsewhere.”242  Moreover, the imposition of a 
monetary disincentive does not require any specialized 
knowledge.243  Thus, as a result of the faulty information 
portrayed in DTCA, the First Amendment hindering practical 
regulation of DTCA, and the FDA’s limited resources, 
taxation remains one policy mechanism constitutionally 
available to Congress to remedy the negative effects of DTCA. 
E. Potential Problems 
As with every piece of legislation, removing the tax 
deductions for DTCA presents several concerns.  It is possible 
that even if DTCA becomes more expensive, the industry will 
not shift its spending to research and development.  Rather, 
the drug companies could respond by shifting the spending to 
other promotional activities such as drug detailing, health 
outreach fairs, or grants to patient advocacy groups.  The 
wealth of alternatives might strengthen the argument that 
the change in the Tax Code did not impermissibly constrain 
speech, since the companies retain many other ways to 
disseminate their messages.  Indeed, the DTCA channel itself 
remains fully legal, with only the public subsidy removed. 
 240. THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 32–33. 
 241. Mayer, Lobbying, supra note 28, at 494. 
 242. Weisbach & Nussim, Tax and Spending, supra note 20, at 958. 
 243. See id. at 958–59.  Authors explained that where specialization is not 
required for a particular task, there may be benefits to coordinating certain 
activities.  Id.  Accordingly, this would be an appropriate instance to use the 
Tax Code, which is already being used rather than to start trying to find 
another way to achieve the same result.  Id. 
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Of course, if the industry reacted by increasing total drug 
advertising, some of the congressional policy objectives would 
not be met.  While predicting the industry’s next move if 
Congress eliminates the tax deduction presents a challenge,244 
whether the policy achieves its goals will be an empirical 
question. 
Additionally, the removal of the deductions for DTCA 
may either disproportionately impact different companies for 
the same conduct245 and may result in over deterrence of 
DTCA.  Denying deductions is not intended to cease DTCA, 
but rather to remove the public subsidy. Proponents’ 
arguments include some justifications for the practice that, if 
true, provide compelling reasons to ensure its continued 
existence.  Accordingly, while the removal of deductions 
would probably not lead to complete deterrence246 this Article 
argues that some measure of deterrence through the IRC is 
the appropriate means to deter.  Thus, in the alternative to 
the removal of the deductions, Congress should institute a 
cap on the amount which may be deducted for DTCA, just as 
they have done for certain executive compensation, to reduce 
spending.247 
CONCLUSION 
In the face of compelling public policy justifications, as 
judged by Congress, the Tax Code could be revised to deny 
tax deductions for DTCA.  The removal of this public subsidy 
 244. See Donohue, A Decade of DTCA, supra note 74, at 677–78 (“Driven by 
increases in direct-to-consumer advertising, total promotion as a percentage of 
sales has increased substantially during the past 5 years, leading some 
observers to worry that consumers must bear these increased costs in the form 
of higher prices.  Economic theory and evidence suggest that changes in 
marketing costs are unlikely to have a direct effect on pharmaceutical prices, 
which largely reflect perceptions of product value held by consumers, 
physicians, and payers.  Of course, it is possible that advertising reduces the 
price responsiveness of demand and thus leads manufacturers to increase 
prices, but the empirical evidence on this point is mixed.”). 
 245. See Walker, supra note 6, at 1259–60 (explaining Eric Zolt’s article 
discussing the effect of tax penalties). 
 246. See, e.g., Walker, supra note 6, at 1275–79 (for an explanation of optimal 
and complete deterrence). 
 247. See I.R.C. § 162(m) (2006) (stating that “[i]n the case of any publicly 
held corporation, no deduction shall be allowed under this chapter for applicable 
employee remuneration with respect to any covered employee to the extent that 
the amount of such remuneration for the taxable year with respect to such 
employee exceeds $1,000,000”). 
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would be constitutional and the likely resulting decrease is 
public exposure to DTCA is properly aligned with public 
policy.  The First Amendment protects commercial-free 
speech and does not allow Congress to discriminate on the 
basis of content and speaker to restrict certain parties’ use 
and access to information, but allows others.  Under the First 
Amendment, Congress also may not institute a law 
preventing companies from spending money on protected 
speech.  These protections, however, do not require Congress 
to continue to subsidize DTCA with a subsidy from the public 
fisc. 
 
